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I. INTRODUCTION
Although today more law exists in statutory form rather than in
common law, courts do not have clear-cut guidelines for interpreting
statutes. Courts must, therefore, interpret statutes in light of the particu-
lar facts of each case, generally through consideration of legislative
intent as evidenced by the purpose, text, and legislative history of the
statute. This Note analyzes a recent Federal Circuit interpretation of a
statute enacted to enhance protection for U.S. process patent holders.
Unfortunately, that court's interpretation of the statute has returned a
certain group of those patent holders to the position they held before
enactment of the statute-with no protection against foreign infringers
importing products made using U.S.-patented processes.
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Analyzing the statute through several leading statutory interpreta-
tion techniques casts doubt on the Federal Circuit's decision to interpret
the statute by examining its legislative history. Using this approach, the
Court applied a test set forth in one committee report. This test is not
uniformly applicable in the field of chemical processing, however, due
to the nature of chemical reactions on various materials' physical and
chemical properties. Additionally, it is unclear why the Federal Circuit
examined the statute in such detail when it could have reached the same
result under the facts of the case without interpreting vague statutory
language.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION GUIDELINES
Although Congress is responsible for drafting and enacting legisla-
tion in the form of statutes and thus, has "the central responsibility for
the statutory management of social policy in the substantive areas allo-
cated to it under the applicable constitution,"' courts are responsible for
interpretation of statutes. Statutes are now "our primary source of law
... [and] statutory interpretation has reemerged as an important topic of
academic theory and discussion."2 At least one commentator has sug-
gested that "[t]he standard criterion for proper interpretation of a statute
is to find 'the intention of the legislature."' 3 As Professor Radin con-
tended, however, a legislative body has no intent and, even if it did, "the
intent would not govern application of the statute."4
Courts have taken various approaches to statutory interpretation. In
order to adequately advise their clients, lawyers must have some sense
of which approach a particular court will take.5 Professors Eskridge and
Frickey analyzed various approaches to statutory interpretation used by
courts today: "foundational; ...theor[ies] that identif[y] a single pri-
mary legitimate source of interpretation.., and adhere[ ] to the statutory
meaning that source suggests, regardless of the circumstances or conse-
1. Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1983).
2. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321 (1990). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 262 (1985) ("[T]he interpretation of statutes is an extremely
important function of the federal courts and one that... does not receive the systematic scholarly
attention it deserves.").
3. JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 32 (1982).
4. See id. (citing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930)).
5. See id. at 31-32 ("Few of the multitude of choices people make everyday affected by what
they find in statute books ever come before a court; what judges do is important, but it is
outreached by the vast number of occasions on which laymen, lawyers, and executive and
administrative officers make final decisions on the meaning of legislation.... Statutory texts ...
derive much of their impact from the uses others than legislators make of them.").
[Vol. 52:389
ELI LILLY & CO. V. AMERICAN CYANAMID CO.
quences."6 Three of the "foundational" statutory interpretation theories
analyzed involve the use of: (1) statutory purpose (purposivism); (2)
statutory text (textualism); and (3) legislative intent (intentionalism).7
The authors point out that each of these approaches to statutory interpre-
tation "rests upon questionable premises about the nature of interpreta-
tion and the legislative process. . . . [N]one . . . systematically
produce[s] determinate results in the 'hard cases,' which undermines
their claims to 'objectivity."" In practice, the authors found that the
Supreme Court uses all three approaches, reaching final statutory inter-
pretations by comparing results under each approach and determining
which best accomplishes the goal of the statute at issue in light of cir-
cumstances that may not have been anticipated when the statute was
enacted. 9
A. Purposivism
Purposivism requires identifying the purpose or objective of the
statute, and "deducing the interpretation with which it is most consis-
tent." 10 Also referred to as the "mischief rule" (what mischief was the
legislature trying to correct when it passed the statute?)," this approach
assumes the statute "must be read in the light of some assumed purpose.
A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is non-
sense."' 2 The purpose of the statute may be gleaned from a variety of
sources including any purpose stated therein, the circumstances under
which the statute was enacted, and its legislative history.' 3 The statute
should be given meaning in light of this purpose. 4
An example of purposivism is found in Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States."' There, the Court analyzed a statutory provision
imposing a penalty for importation of aliens into the United States for
the purpose of performing any labor or service. The church wished to
6. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 321 n.2.
7. See id. at 322.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 345-62.
10. Id. at 333.
11. See WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 77 (John F. O'Connell
& Bruce Comly French eds., 2d ed. 1984).
12. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950).
13. See STATSKY, supra note 11, at 78.
14. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (1994) (positing that, in interpreting a statute, the
court should "[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute" and "[i]nterpret the
words of the statute ... so as to carry out the purpose as best it can").
15. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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bring a minister into the country from England to become its pastor.' 6
Although the Court found the contract between the church and the pastor
fell within the letter of the statute, it also concluded that the statute was
intended to prohibit the importation by contractors of unskilled labor in
order to prevent the degradation of American labor. 7 In overturning the
lower federal court ruling that the church had violated the statute, the
Court "prefer[red] what [it] deem[ed] to be the substantive ends of a
statute over its text.""8 The Court thus interpreted the statute in light of
its purpose over its text.
The fiction that the legislature can be of one mind, and have one
purpose, has many weaknesses. As Judge Mikva pointed out:
[T]he real problem is that we start out with 435 prima donnas in the
House and 100 prima donnas in the Senate, and the name of the game
is to get them to agree on a single set of words ....
Those 535 people... are going to find it difficult to agree on an
agenda, let alone on the words to describe whatever consensus they
reach. The consensus that is reached to get a bill passed in the first
place is a tenuous and confused one. Is it any wonder that the words
they do finally choose tend to have diffuse and ambiguous
meanings?19
Problems with using purposivism as a foundational theory of statutory
interpretation include assumptions that "the legislature is filled with rea-
sonable people who will reach reasonable, purposive results by follow-
ing established procedures"2 and that various purposes of the range of
interest groups in the legislature can "be aggregated into a public pur-
pose."'" For example, examining the purpose behind the enactment of a
portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reveals that:
Title VII seems to be one of the most purposive statutes ... adopted
in [recent] years.... Yet [its] purpose [of nondiscrimination] is com-
promised in many ways by statutory exceptions for small businesses,
union seniority arrangements, and so forth. Thus it is not a principle
that Congress was willing to implement at any price. How, then, can
the overall purpose control statutory interpretation, when it is clear
that Congress itself did not believe in it without reservation? 22
"Moreover, [m]odern political theory, especially public choice the-
ory, renders the political theory assumptions of purposivist statutory
16. See id. at 458.
17. See id. at 458, 459, 463-65.
18. HURST, supra note 3, at 48.
19. Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 380.
20. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 334.
21. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 336 (footnote omitted).
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interpretation highly controversial."23
Using purposivism as the sole technique of statutory interpretation
also presents a problem because "text is the only thing enacted into law,
[and] is formally the most legitimate expression of legislative intent or
purpose. 24 Purposivist theory can potentially defeat the goal that citi-
zens "be able to open up the statute books and have a good idea of their
rights and obligations. When the statute seems plainly to say one thing,
courts should be reluctant to alter that directive."25
B. Textualism
Textualism, also called the "plain meaning rule,"26 is based on the
premise that "[t]he beginning, and usually the end, of statutory interpre-
tation should be the apparent meaning of the statutory language. ' 27 As
Justice Holmes said, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we
ask only what the statute means. '28 Interpretation of the text of a statute,
however, requires more than merely reading the words of the statute.
While, in the absence of textual ambiguity, courts should enforce a stat-
ute according to its terms, "[t]he meaning of language is derived from its
context.... [T]he meaning of words cannot be conclusively established
in the abstract. ' 29  Accordingly, the meaning of the words in a statute
must be determined from the purpose of the statute. 30  Justice Frank-
furter explained that, "[tihe notion that because the words of a statute are
plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious
oversimplification."31
The Court's interpretation of the Mann Act in Caminetti v. United
23. Id. at 335; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, Working Paper No. 39, at 2-3 (Nov. 1987) (discussing questions concerning the extent to
which legislation reflects a coherent congressional view of the public interest due to the
perception that congressional enactments are not motivated by conceptions of the public interest
but rather reflect private-interest deals, re-election posturing, or arbitrary outcomes. Based on this
view, it has been suggested that judges should enforce a statute only within the domain of the
plain meaning of its words and abandon interpretation based upon the legal fictions of legislative
intent and statutory purpose).
24. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 337 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 339.
26. See STATSKY, supra note 11, at 75.
27. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 340.
28. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 419
(1899).
29. STATSKY, supra note 11, at 75; see also Radin, supra note 4, at 868 (defining ambiguous
as meaning that a statute has any two possible meanings, whether or not these meanings are
contradictory, and that any statute that describes "a group of possible events within a situation...
is essentially ambiguous").
30. See STATSKY, supra note 11, at 76.
31. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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States32 presents an example of strict textualism. Caminetti had been
found guilty of violating the Act by transporting a woman in interstate
commerce for the "immoral purpose" of becoming his concubine or mis-
tress. The court reasoned that a married man who took an unmarried
woman out-of-state and slept with her had an immoral purpose, and thus
Caminetti was in plain violation of the statute. 33 This strict textualist
approach is "rarely followed today"; courts go outside the "four comers
ofthe statute" to determine if the language in the statute is plain and
unambiguous.34
Judge Wald noted that, in the 1981 Term, "although the Court still
refer[red] to the 'plain meaning' rule, the rule has effectively been laid
to rest .... When the plain meaning rhetoric is invoked, it becomes a
device.., for shifting onto legislative history the burden of proving that
the words do not mean what they appear to say."'35 However, in the
1988-89 Term, she noted that the Court was again relying on text: she
found only five cases in which the Court used outside materials in inter-
preting a statute.36 Justice Scalia has been called the "spiritual leader"
of the Court's return to a textualist approach to statutory interpretation.37
Gregory Maggs credits Justice Scalia with the growing trend toward
decreased reliance on legislative history in statutory interpretation, as
Justice Scalia "has adopted an almost absolute stance against deciding
cases on the basis of anything other than the statutory text."
38
Textualist theory supports the argument that citizens should "be
able to read the statute books and know their rights and duties;"39 how-
ever, "when contextual arguments strongly cut against the textual ones"
the Court sometimes refuses to rely on textualism.4" Thus, when "cur-
rent values and historical context strongly support an interpretation, a
32. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
33. See id. at 486.
34. See STATSKY, supra note 11, at 5.
35. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1983).
36. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 294
(1990).
37. See id. at 281; see also id. at 281-82 (explaining that "the Scalia view has as its bedrock
principle a most unexceptional notion: the role of the courts in interpreting statutes is to ascertain
and effectuate the 'intentions' of Congress as they are expressed when it passes legislation....
Justice Scalia's 'textualist' view departs from th[e] norm," however, because he advocates
determining the meaning of terms in statutes by context, ordinary usage, and compatibility with
the surrounding body of law, as opposed to the frequent practice of resorting to extra-statutory
materials only to explain language that is ambiguous or seemingly contradictory).
38. Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard a
Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PUB. INTEREST L. REV. 57, 58.
39. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 340.
40. See id. at 344.
[Vol. 52:389
ELI LILLY & CO. V. AMERICAN CYANAMID CO.
determinate text will not stand in the way."41
Textualism as the sole source of statutory interpretation suffers
from several deficiencies: it "oversimplif[ies] the meaning of statutory
texts, [is] not so determinate as [it] sound[s], and ignore[s] other values
our polity considers important."42 If a statute must be interpreted by an
appellate court, the textualist approach is inappropriate. Judge Wald
points out that "[d]isputes that are resolved by plain statutory language
usually settle long before they make their way into the federal appellate
courts. 4 3 If the plain meaning of a statute can be easily interpreted
from its text, the trial court should be able to resolve the issue. Only
those statutes where the meaning is not clear from the text should thus
be interpreted by higher courts.
C. Intentionalism
A third, somewhat controversial approach to statutory interpretation
requires an examination of legislative history to ascertain the intent of
the legislature in enacting the statute. Under this approach, the Court
seeks to determine whether "specific facts currently in controversy were
ever discussed by the legislature while it was considering the proposed
statute" and "the broad or narrow purpose that prompted the legislature
to enact the proposed statute."" As compared to a purposivism
approach, in which the Court may review the legislative history to ascer-
tain the purpose of the enactment of the statute, under this approach, the
Court looks for discussions of specific fact situations to determine how
the legislature wanted these situations resolved.45
Judge Wald found that; in the 1981 Term, "[n]o occasion for statu-
tory construction ...exist[ed] when the Court [did] not look at the
legislative history,"46 whereas "[e]arly American courts ... used legisla-
41. Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 341.
43. Wald, supra note 36, at 301.
44. STATSKY, supra note 11, at 99.
45. See HAR & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1379:
The history should be examined for the light it throws on general purpose.
Evidence of specific intention with respect to particular applications is competent
only to the extent that the particular applications illuminate the general purpose and
are consistent with other evidence of it .... Effect should not be given to evidence
from the internal legislative history if the result would be to contradict a purpose
otherwise indicated and to yield an interpretation disadvantageous to private persons
who had no reasonable means of access to the history.
(emphasis added).
46. Wald, supra note 35, at 195 (emphasis added). But see Maggs, supra note 38, at 58
(noting that, during the 1992-93 Term, the Court appeared to be cutting down on reliance on
legislative history); Wald, supra note 36, at 281 (reporting that, during the 1988-89 Term, there
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:389
tive history sparingly."47 "The Canadians came to joke that the Ameri-
can rule was: 'whenever the legislative history is ambiguous it is
permissible to refer to the statute."' 4 8  In contrast, English courts
"refus[e] to consider legislative history. 49
Massachusetts v. Morash5 ° exemplifies the use of legislative his-
tory to interpret a statute contrary to its text even though the meaning of
the statute appears clear on its face. The Court there interpreted regular
employer-provided vacation benefits as not covered under ERISA as an
"employee welfare benefit plan." Although ERISA specifically refers to
vacation benefits when defining an "employee welfare benefit plan,"5
the Court concluded after examining the legislative history of ERISA
that conventional vacation benefits were not included.52 The Court
explained in part that "in expounding a statute, we [are] not ... guided
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions
of the whole law, and to its object and policy."53
Even though the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation
presents a variety of problems, many disagree with Justice Scalia's rigid
stance against its use. 54 One argument against the use of legislative his-
tory "attacks reliance on materials other than statutory text because Con-
gress has a voice as a constitutional player only through its finally
enacted statutes, not through any supplementary explanation thereof.
55
was "a fully articulated and quite aggressive assault in the Supreme Court on the use of legislative
history in construing statutes").
47. Wald, supra note 35, at 196.
48. Id. at 197.
49. See William S. Jordan, III, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The
Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 2 (1994).
50. 490 U.S. 107 (1989).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
52. See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. at 114-15.
53. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51
(1987)).
54. See Posner, supra note 2, at 269 ("It is tempting to argue that because legislators vote on
the statutory language rather than on the legislative history, they cannot be presumed to have
assented to all that has been said, either in the committee reports or on the floor, about a bill that
becomes law. But if legislators know that courts look to legislative history in interpreting
statutes-and they do know this-then when they vote for a bill they are assenting, in a sense, to
at least some of what is in that history."); Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 32-33 ("The Scalia-
Easterbrook arguments might seem to apply with some force when a statute is unambiguous on its
face.... But where a reader could reasonably attribute more than one meaning to the statute, the
Scalia-Easterbrook arguments misfire. When statutory language could have one of several
meanings, the ideal of 'government by laws' is irrelevant, because our problem is precisely that
we don't know what the 'laws' require."); Wald, supra note 35, at 200-01, 202 ("[Ilt is unrealistic
to say ... that courts should only consider certain items .... Committee reports indeed remain the
most widely accepted indicators of Congress' intent... Courts can benefit, however, from access
to more information concerning those stages of the legislative process that are most critical. For
example, committee and subcommittee markups are key points in the process.").
55. Wald, supra note 36, at 285; see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (7th Cir.
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Another argument contends that silence in the form of absence of objec-
tion by legislators in the materials is interpreted as consent by legisla-
tors.56 Additionally, "[w]hen courts and agencies use legislative history
to find a more specific intent than the statute expresses, legislators have
an incentive to 'manufacture' legislative history on points of interest to
them."
57
Manufacturing legislative history offers two advantages over
amending [a bill].... [I]t is quicker and easier than drafting, debat-
ing, and voting on an amendment... [and] increases the chances that
the member's intentions will become law if they are controversial.
Other members of Congress may never learn of the legislative his-
tory. This is especially true if it is manufactured in the house that is
considering the bill after the other house has completed its
consideration.58
Another objection is that because legislative history can be created
after legislation has left one house, its use violates the presentment and
bicameralism requirements of the Constitution, similar to the legislative
veto at issue in INS v. Chadha.59 In response to this argument, Profes-
sors Farber and Frickey counter that "Article I procedural requirements
are fully satisfied" because "the materials on which judicial interpreta-
tion is based are available to both Houses of Congress and to the Presi-
dent," and "the decision by each entity as to whether to approve a bill
can be based on an appraisal of the bill's probable judicial interpreta-
tion."6 However, this argument fails to consider the amount of time
required by the legislative and executive branch members to fully con-
sider all pieces of what might be considered relevant material to deduce
how the judiciary may interpret a bill. "[D]ocuments of legislative his-
tory ...are still generally inaccessible," and the cost of researching
these documents can be substantial.6
Several commentators have noted that legislative history should
1989) (discussing the fact that legislative history is not subject to vote or veto, and therefore,
resort to intent is no more forceful than resort to an opinion poll revealing the wishes of Congress,
which does not translate to legal rules).
56. See W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation
Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 396 (1992) ("The assumption is that if the other
legislators had not agreed with what any particular legislator said, some of them, at least, would
have voiced their own opinions, and these contrary expressions would also be in the record. Their
absence therefore implies unanimous agreement.").
57. Id. at 397.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
60. Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 33.
61. STATSKY, supra note 11, at 106; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use
of Legislative History, 1987 DuuE L.J. 371, 378 ("[T]he costs extend beyond the bar and its
clients: the judiciary must also devote time searching through mountains of material.").
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only be consulted if the statute is ambiguous.62 However, ambiguity
must be distinguished from vagueness. Professor Slawson contends that
vagueness in a statute is not a mistake but rather "measures the length to
which the legislature chose to go in determining the outcomes of future
cases," and thus legislative history should never be used to reduce
vagueness.63
If legislative history is to be consulted in statutory interpretation,
which particular "parts ... actually cast light on [the statute's] mean-
ing?"' The various types of legislative history include study group rec-
ommendations, committee hearings and reports, floor debates, the
adoption, non-adoption, or rejection of interim amendments, and post-
enactment developments.65
Many commentators consider committee reports the most reliable
source of legislative history,66 and post-enactment history the least relia-
ble. 67 However, in a Congressional Research Service report prepared to
"assist Members and staff in determining where their best chance (short
of amendment) is to influence interpretation of legislation," 68 the author
noted that conference committee reports are "especially persuasive evi-
dence of congressional intent" because conference committee action is
62. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1236-37 (suggesting that the plain meaning
rule calls for no analysis by the court if the meaning is plain on the face of the statute, but if the
words seem ambiguous to the court, alternative arguments as to meaning might be required, which
would take account of outside aids); HURST, supra note 3, at 55 ("Judges in the United States
routinely stipulate that before they will consider evidence of legislative intent outside the words of
the statute they must be persuaded that the words taken in themselves are of uncertain
meaning .... [T]he rule makes a showing of uncertainty on the face of the statute an absolute
prerequisite to looking beyond the face."); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
63. Slawson, supra note 56, at 423.
64. POSNER, supra note 2, at 269.
65. See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 1130-33.
66. See, e.g., STATSKY, supra note 11, at 108-09 ("Perhaps the most reliable documents of
legislative history are the committee reports .... These reports often have two main components.
[Tihey state the purpose of the bill. They will often include discussions of prior law on the subject
of the bill ... [and] the reports contain a section-by-section summary of the bill."); Mikva, supra
note 19, at 385 ("I always find that the committee report is the most useful device; it is what I use
to try to resolve some of those ambiguities. Most of the time.., the committee report represents
the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion and debate on the issue."); cf Dickerson, supra
note 1, at 1131 ("Committee reports are the second most reliable kind of legislative history. Their
main value is in showing (if they do) the ulterior purposes that the respective bills are intended to
advance.").
67. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 270 ("Postenactment statements ... as to what the
legislation meant should ... be given little or no weight in general."); Dickerson, supra note 1, at
1133 ("Post-enactment developments should be disregarded for purposes of cognition, simply
because at enactment they were taken into account by neither the authors of the statute nor its
audience.").
68. GEORGE A. COSTELLO, SOURCES OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY As AIDS TO STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION CRS-I (Jan. 27, 1989).
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"frequently the critical stage in shaping legislation."69 He cautioned,
however, that the explanations therein "are often brief, cryptic; or totally
absent," in which case "courts may attempt to read the resulting lan-
guage as not expanding the scope of the reconciled House and Senate
versions."7 The author recognized that "[o]rdinarily, committee reports
are considered the most reliable and persuasive element of legislative
history,"7 1 although "[tihe Court is wary of efforts in committee reports
to spell out specific results in future litigation if those results do not
necessarily follow from statutory language. ' 72  Where the committee
report explanations of the two houses are different, a court may favor
one explanation over the other as better reflecting its own reading of the
statute; where equally plausible explanations are contradictory between
the two reports, a court may rely upon whichever report was before both
houses.73
D. Statutory Interpretation by "Practical Reasoning"
The debate continues on the proper guidelines to follow in statutory
interpretation. Canons of construction suffer from the reality that there
are two opposing canons on almost every point.74
Professors Eskridge and Frickey found that the Supreme Court's
approach to statutory interpretation "is largely grounded in practical rea-
soning,"75 a theory they derived from "an analysis of the Court's actual
practice in statutory interpretation cases ... and from [an] interpretation
of the pragmatic and hermeneutical traditions in philosophy."76 They
point out that:
[S]tatutory interpretation involves creative policymaking by judges
and is not just the Court's figuring out the answer that was put 'in'
the statute by the enacting legislature....
... [C]reation of statutory meaning is not a mechanical opera-
69. Id. at Summary to CRS-6.
70. Id. at Summary to CRS-7.
71. Id. at CRS-3.
72. Id.
73. See id. at CRS-4.
74. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON: DECIDING APPEALS 521 (1960);
see also STATSKY, supra note 11, at 83-95 ("Rules of interpretation are commonly called 'canons
of construction.' In fact, however, they are not rules or laws in the technical sense of this
word.... No court is required to apply a canon."); POSNER, supra note 2, at 276-86 (discussing
various canons of construction and noting that "[a] realistic understanding of legislation is
devastating to the canons of construction").
75. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 383.
76. Id. at 345. "Hermeneutics suggests that the text lacks meaning until it is interpreted." Id.
at 346. "American pragmatism ... complements this .. . insight. Reasoning in human affairs
does not seek abstract answers, but concretely useful results." Id.
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tion, [and] often involves the interpreter's choice among several com-
peting answers....
... [S]tatutory interpreters ... are normally not driven by any
single value ... but are instead driven by multiple values. 7
Eskridge and Frickey suggest that, in hard cases, "the evidence
points in different directions, and the Court critically analyzes each tex-
tual or historical or evolutive argument, both as to its own cogency and
as to its cogency in light of the other evidence. 78 Judge Wald's obser-
vations of the 1981 Supreme Court Term agree with this analysis:
I cannot conclude that any ideological wing of the Court uses an
'intent' analysis more than 'purpose' or gives greater weight to plain
language and canons than to legislative history. Frankly, the same
Justices who rely on plain language and repudiate thirty years of con-
trary judicial interpretation in one case say in another that they must
look to the broad purposes of the act and not to any cramped phrase-
ology .... [I]n the present state of the law, the various approaches to
statutory construction are drawn out as needed.... 79
Likewise in her analysis of statutory interpretation cases by the
Supreme Court in 1988-89, Judge Wald found that,
"[i]n eighteen cases, the Court referred to legislative history to con-
firm its reading of statutory language,"8 in eight cases, "legislative
history was able to shed some light on the particular issue for deci-
sion,"" "in twenty-four cases, the Court failed to find specific
answers to the legislative history questions before it but did glean
important understandings of the fundamental purposes of the Act,
' 82
and "[i]n only five cases ... did the Court use legislative materials to
come to a different result from that derived from the arguably 'plain'
language of the statute. '"83
Although Judge Wald analyzed the use of textualism versus legisla-
tive history in statutory interpretation by the Court, her results confirm
that the Court does not follow any one approach to statutory interpreta-
tion. Rather, it reaches its decisions by utilizing a variety of interpretive
techniques.
An example of the results reached by the use of various interpreta-
tive techniques is seen in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.84 There, the
77. Id. at 345-48.
78. Id. at 323.
79. Wald, supra note 35, at 215.
80. Wald, supra note 36, at 289.
81. Id. at 292.
82. Id. at 293.
83. Id. at 294.
84. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
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Court interpreted a statutory provision to determine if Congress had
intended that gravel be considered a mineral for purposes of the stat-
ute."5 The majority interpreted the section, which read "all the coal and
minerals" to include gravel.8 6 The Court used the principles of purposi-
vism and textualism to reach this result, and considered alternative inter-
pretations that produced results at odds with the purpose of the statute. 7
The dissent interpreted the statute by considering the intent of Congress
at the time the statute was written88 and concluded that all gravel was
never intended by Congress to be classified as a mineral. 89 Both sides
determined that the definition of mineral was not clear on the face of the
statute. However, each used the same interpretative techniques-
85. See id. at 37-38.
86. See id. at 56.
87. See id. at 42-60. The Court considered a variety of definitions of "mineral" and
determined that the legal understanding of the term "minerals" prevailing when the statute was
enacted did not indicate whether Congress intended the mineral reservation in the statute to
include gravel. See id. at 42-44. The Court also reviewed an administrative decision by the
Secretary of the Interior indicating that "land containing deposits of gravel and sand useful for
building purposes was not mineral land beyond the reach of homestead laws .... " Id. at 45. The
Court concluded that the purpose of the Act was "that the mineral reservation... includes gravel,"
Id. at 47, because "Congress intended to facilitate development of both surface and subsurface
resources, [so] the determination of whether a particular substance is included in the surface estate
or the mineral estate should be made in light of the use of the surface estate that Congress
contemplated." Id. at 52. Legislative history revealed "Congress' understanding that the mineral
reservation would 'limit the operation of this bill strictly to the surface of the lands."' Id. at 60
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 64-35, 18 (1916)). "Given Congress' understanding that the surface of
[the] lands would be used for ranching and fanning, we interpret the mineral reservation in the Act
to include substances that are mineral in character .... that can be removed from the soil, and that
can be used for commercial purposes, and that there is no reason to suppose were intended to be
included in the surface estate." Id. at 53. Noting that the statutory language was ambiguous, the
majority found that an interpretation that "convey[ed] gravel deposits to the farmers and
stockmen" would "produce a result at odds with the purposes underlying the statute. Instead, we
interpret the language of the statute in a way that will further Congress' overriding objective of
facilitating the concurrent development of surface and subsurface resources." Id. at 56. The
Court found its decision was "supported by the treatment of gravel under other federal statutes
concerning minerals," id. at 56, and under "the established rule that land grants are construed
favorably to the Government ... and that if there are doubts they are resolved for the Government,
not against it." Id. at 59 (quoting United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116
(1957)).
88. See id. at 62-72 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent cited an Interior Department rule and
noted that "[a] search of the standard American authorities has failed to disclose a single one
which classifies a deposit such as claimed in this case as a mineral." Id. at 64 (quoting
Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310, 312 (1910)). The dissent interpreted the
legislative history as silent on the definition of mineral, see id. at 65-66, remarked that Congress
removed gravel from the purview of general mining laws, see id. at 69, and concluded that the
legislative history indicated "[c]ongressional interest in stockraising and mineral development was
subordinate to the ultimate congressional purpose of settling the West." Id. at 71. "Congress
surely did not intend to destroy that sovereignty by reserving the commonplace substances that
actually constitute much of that soil." Id. at 71-72.
89. See id. at 70 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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purposivism, textualism, related statutes, and prior administrative rul-
ings-and reached opposite conclusions.
When interpreting a statute, courts should consider all the tech-
niques discussed above and "decide what attribution of meaning to the
statute will yield the most reasonable result in the case at hand....9
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCESS PATENT
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
The problems of statutory construction and resulting interpretation
by the courts are illustrated in two cases brought under a statute enacted
as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. That
statute, the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, was enacted with
the express purpose of protecting the economic value of U.S.-patented
processes and "provid[ing] meaningful protection to owners of patented
processes" 91 by allowing a cause of action in federal court by U.S. pro-
cess patent holders against persons who use the patented process in
another country and subsequently import a product of that process into
this country. Prior to passage of the Act, such activity did not offend
U.S. patent law because only infringing acts occurring within U.S. terri-
tory were prohibited; patent laws are territorial and the United States had
no authority in foreign locales where alleged infringing activity
occurred.
A. Background of the Act
Because intellectual property laws vary in significant respects
among various countries, some countries have attempted to harmonize
intellectual property protection by participating in the Paris Convention
and the recent TRIPS agreement (part of the Uruguay Round of GATT).
The Paris Convention has been the underlying source of international
industrial property protection for the past century.92 Under the Paris
Convention, "Article 5 quater mandates that each member nation must
treat imported products manufactured by processes patented in the coun-
try of importation as if those products were manufactured in that coun-
try."93 Consequently, U.S. law did not comply with this provision
before passage of the Act because an action for infringement could lie
only if the infringing act took place in U.S. territory; the Paris Conven-
tion calls for infringement in such cases despite the location of the
90. POSNER, supra note 2, at 287.
91. H.R. REP. No. 100-60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987).
92. See Glenn E.J. Murphy, Note, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, 9 J.L. &
COM. 267, 280 (1989).
93. id. at 293.
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infringing act.94 Passage of the Act thus brought U.S. law into compli-
ance with the Paris Convention in the protection of products of patented
processes.
Similar to the Paris Convention, the recent TRIPS agreement sets
out minimum standards of intellectual property protection which mem-
ber nations must implement. 95 TRIPS "standards are set at a level com-
parable to those in the major industrial countries today. . . . The
Agreement sets these standards by requiring ...compliance with the
substantive obligations of the main WIPO conventions, the Paris Con-
vention, and the Berne Convention .... "96 Under TRIPS, the United
States is compelled to comply with the Paris Convention for protection
of products of patented processes. Passage of the Act also brought U.S.
law into compliance with TRIPS.
A WIPO committee in 1986 noted that eleven countries (including
Japan and most of the EC) provided patent protection to direct products
of patented processes, whereas seven countries (including the United
States) did not.97 Thus, the Act brought U.S. law into conformity with
the laws of these other industrialized nations.
The Senate recognized that the sovereignty of other countries must
be respected, noting that:
The bill does not attempt to prevent the use of the process in another
country.... If the U.S. process patentholder has not obtained a simi-
lar patent in the other country, he has no right by virtue of his U.S.
patent to prevent anyone from using the process in that country....
[The bill] protect[s] against the entry into the U.S. marketplace of
goods made abroad without authorization from the inventor who has
a process patent in this country. The patent is on the process alone,
but the entry of the goods made elsewhere by that process clearly
encroaches on the rights of the patent owner.98
The Act does not invade the sovereignty of other nations' patent
laws (at least those who are members of the Paris Convention), and is no
more invasive on non-members' patent laws than the laws of those
94. See id. at 282 (arguing that Article 5 quater is enforceable in federal courts due to a
Supreme Court ruling that "the Paris Convention is self-executing and its provisions are
immediately applicable by the Patent Office or Federal courts. However.... no Federal court has
applied its provisions ... [and] while it appears that Federal courts would be willing to enforce
Article 5 quater, no U.S. process patentees have opted to take that chance.").
95. Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance With TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29
VAMD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 394 (1996); Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 121, 125 (1994).
96. Otten & Wager, supra note 95, at 396.
97. See Intellectual Property and Trade: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
520 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings], Memorandum by the Int'l Bureau of WIPO.
98. S. REP. No. 100-83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1987).
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members of the Paris Convention who already protect the products of
patented processes. Certain less-developed countries (LDCs) have com-
plained that such provisions are an invasion of their sovereignty;99 how-
ever, due to the "general lack of consensus among LDCs regarding
process patents ... [and] the peripheral participation of LDCs in the
international patent system, . . . U.S. efforts at harmonization with world
patent laws give little consideration to LDC patent systems."' °
The express congressional intent in passage of the Act was to pro-
tect the economic value of U.S. patented processes and to preserve
American jobs. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary recognized that
"[i]mportation, use and sale in the United States of products produced by
processes patented in this country severely diminishes the value of such
patents."1 °1 Similarly, the House Committee on the Judiciary observed
that "the unfettered ability of others to import, sell or use a product made
by the patented processes, severely diminishes the value of a U.S. pro-
cess patent. It also results in the loss of American jobs, particularly in
new technology areas."12
The Act makes it easier for U.S. process patent holders to obtain
relief from an infringing foreign manufacturer, as compared to actions
for relief under the prior law. Prior to passage of the Act, U.S. process
patent owners were required to bring actions against an infringer either
through Articles 5 and 28 of the Paris Convention, GATT, or section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.103 Each of these actions has drawbacks
compared to a suit in federal court, however, where a party can obtain
damages and injunctive relief against an infringer;1 also, actions under
these alternatives are time consuming, expensive, and can be difficult to
prove.10 5 However, Congress added two exceptions to the Act in section
271(g) concerning what constitutes an infringing product made from a
U.S. patented process, which exceptions have caused difficult interpre-
tive questions: if the product of the patented process (a) is materially
changed by subsequent processes, or (b) becomes a trivial and nonessen-
tial component of another product, the imported product will not be con-
sidered infringing. 10
99. See Murphy, supra note 92, at 296-97. Brazil, in particular, has complained that under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States has no right to exclude Brazilian
pharmaceutical products as products of piracy. See id.
100. Id. at 295.
101. S. REp. No. 100-83, at 31 (1987).
102. H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 3 (1987).
103. See Murphy, supra note 92, at 280-89.
104. See S. REP. No. 100-83, at 2 (1987).
105. See Murphy, supra note 92, at 283-89.
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1995 Supp.). This section reads:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells
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As noted above, most foreign patent laws limit patent protection to
"direct" products of the patented process."°7 Notably, the statutory
exceptions do not contain the "direct" product language found in the
laws of other countries; however, this difference should not be construed
as giving federal courts more flexibility than their foreign counterparts
in finding products infringing. Rather, the word "direct" was replaced
with the phrase "materially changed" because of the constraints Con-
gress believed such language could cause in judicial interpretation.
10 8
The Senate Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice hesitated to use the term "directly" in the wording of
the Act because "words like these take on . . . legal connotations." ' 0 9
To determine the extent of protection provided by use of the word
"directly," the U.S. delegation raised the question at a WIPO committee
meeting of how to distinguish between products "obtained directly" and
those not "obtained directly" from a patented process. In reply, the
WIPO final report states that "until the resulting product ha[s] been
materially changed, it should be considered to have been obtained
directly from the patented process." ' 0
The use of the term "materially changed" thus should not be con-
sidered an expansive departure from comparable countries' patent pro-
tection for products of patented processes. Rather, this term was used
or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in
the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale,
or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for
infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on
account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no
adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or
other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a
patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made
after-
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.
107. See S. REP. No. 100-83, at 36, 49 (1987). Discussing the differences between U.S. patent
law and that of foreign nations, the Senate Report points out that most industrialized nations limit
process patent laws to products made directly from the process and that Congress decided against
including the word "directly" in the statute out of concern that the term might be construed too
broadly and possibly exempt too many products that have been altered in insignificant ways after
manufacture by the patented process. See id. at 49; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
108. See S. REP. No. 100-83, at 36, 49 (1987) (noting that the "materially changed" wording is
to "serve the same general purpose of restricting the scope of the bill to exclude ultimate products
that, because of intervening manufacturing steps, cease to have a reasonable nexus with the
patented process").
109. Hearings, supra note 97, at 280 (statement of David Mallino, Legislative Director,
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO).
110. Id. at 528 (report by the Committee of Experts on the Harmonization of Certain
Provisions in Laws for the Protection of Inventions. The report also included a request for
examples from participants to illustrate application of this term.) See id.
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because the word "directly" has legal connotations peculiar to the U.S.
judicial system which could result in more restrictive results than in
other countries.
As written, the Act exhibits opposing purposes. The first purpose
is to give a U.S. process patent holder legal protection against foreign
manufacturers who use a patented process and subsequently import a
product of that patented process.'11 The second purpose is to protect
foreign manufacturers whose final imported products are too far
removed from the final product of the patented process to be considered
infringing.11 2 Between these two extremes, of course, lie the most diffi-
cult cases-cases that require courts to apply the exceptions and draw a
line where an imported product is "materially changed" from the product
of a U.S. patented process. Courts must walk a tightrope in these cases.
They cannot be too protective of process patent holders, as this could
negatively affect international trade and provide a disincentive for U.S.
patent process holders to obtain foreign patents. Alternatively, the rea-
son for enactment of the statute was to protect these process patent hold-
ers. Courts should consider these issues when interpreting the Act.
Congress specifically recognized the importance of protecting pro-
cess patents in the pharmaceutical industry, 13 and representatives of the
industry played significant roles in the hearings on the passage of the
Act. The positions of both U.S. process patent holders (name-brand
drug companies) and foreign manufacturers (generic drug companies)
were in conflict because the name-brand drug companies desired the
protection being offered, while some generic drug companies felt they
might experience higher costs because the active ingredients imported as
raw materials might be manufactured overseas in violation of U.S. pro-
cess patents.' 
14
Disputes have arisen over what is included under the two excep-
tions. Not surprisingly, drug companies have taken opposite views on
what constitutes a "material change" in a product for the purpose of
exclusion from infringement under the statute. Two federal court cases,
one involving an appellate decision, both of which centered around
generic drug importation, have formed the basis for judicial interpreta-
tion of the two exceptions included in the Act by Congress.
In the following sections, the Act will be analyzed using standard
statutory interpretative techniques to demonstrate how the statutory lan-
111. See supra notes 91, 101, 102, and accompanying text.
112. See H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 13-14 (1987); S. REP. No. 100-83, at 49-50 (1987).
113. See S. REP. No. 100-83, at 30 (1987).
114. See Hearings, supra note 97, at 163 (statement of Dee Fensterer, President, Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association).
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guage responds to different approaches in the interpretation of the phrase
"materially changed." Next, these cases will be analyzed to illustrate
how the courts responded to this interpretation problem. Comparison of
the results leads one to wonder whether the courts were protective
enough of certain U.S. process patent holders, perhaps opening the door
to substantial economic loss for the chemical process industry.
B. Purposivism
Under purposivist theory, the phrase "materially changed" should
be interpreted in light of the mischief the legislature was trying to cor-
rect when it passed the statute. That mischief is the loss in value to U.S.
process patents due to importation of products made by the process.
However, the statute's primary purpose-to provide meaningful protec-
tion to owners of patented processes-is clearly limited by the statutory
exceptions. Courts must determine whether a product of a U.S. patented
process has been "materially changed" by intervening processes such
that the infringement does not severely diminish the value of the process
patent '1 5 in light of the statute's other purpose-the protection of for-
eign manufacturers whose imported products "cease to have a reason-
able nexus with the patented process."11 6
The surrounding body of law-the patent laws-should also be
considered in this interpretation. The constitutional purpose of the pat-
ent system is to "promote the progress of science and useful arts . .. "
and Congress is empowered to pass all laws to enact the patent sys-
tem. 11 7 The patent system "was not designed to secure to the inventor
his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an induce-
ment, to bring forth new knowledge.""1 8 The Act must also be inter-
preted in light of this purpose; the result should support the promotion of
technology by inducing further invention and disclosure in the field of
art of the patented process.
C. Textualism
The textualist approach emphasizes the words in the statute rather
than the "more abstract and judicially malleable interpretive sources." 1 9
Textualism is not a preferred mode of analysis in this case because
115. See supra notes 101, 102, and accompanying text.
116. S. REP. No. 100-83, at 36 (1987).
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
118. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). The Court noted that the grant of a
patent monopoly, despite early American aversions to such, was for the purpose of "weeding out
those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent." Id.
at 11.
119. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 340.
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"[t]extualism can control statutory interpretation only if the text itself
offers a complete and reasonably determinate source of meaning." 120
The phrase "materially changed" can have several meanings, and must
be interpreted according to context. 12 1 Even in a contextual sense, this
provision of the statute eludes determinative interpretation, as evidenced
by the difficulty the Congress experienced in explaining the concept.
Here, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The lan-
guage may be vague, but vagueness "measures the lengths to which the
legislature chose to go in determining the outcomes of future cases." 122
Textualism does not provide a clear answer to the interpretation of the
phrase "materially changed" because the text does not define the term.
D. Intentionalism
Because actual intent of legislators is difficult to determine, at best,
under this approach courts look to what Eskridge and Frickey call "con-
ventional" legislative intent.
1 23
In this instance, a joint conference committee report as well as
reports by committees of both houses are available for study. The joint
conference committee report reconciles the language of the second
exception between the bills passed by each house which resulted in sec-
tion 271(g). In the House bill,' 24 the second exception was described as
applying when a product "becomes a minor or nonessential component
of another product," ' 5 whereas in the Senate bill,126 it was described as
applying when a product "becomes a trivial and nonessential component
of another product."'
127
The House receded to the Senate version of the bill, with the only
explanation being that, since neither version of the bill "proposed
changes to the concept of apportionment of damages, House recession
120. Id. at 341.
121. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
123. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 326. "Statements made in committee reports
and floor statements by sponsors or floor managers of legislation presumably represent the
legislature's views on specific issues .... [This approach is] legitimated ... only if legislators in
general agree with, or at least acquiesce in, the views of the few actively involved in the passage
of legislation." Id. at 327. Other problems include the facts that committee members may not
represent a cross-section of the legislature and that interest groups may have their legislative allies
"pack committee reports and stage planned colloquies to suggest a meaning for the statute that
they cannot place in the statutory language." See id.
124. Process Patent Amendments Act of 1987, H.R. 1931, 100th Cong. (1987). See H.R. REP.
No. 100-60, at 1 (1987).
125. H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 1 (1987).
126. Process Patent Amendments Act of 1987, S. 1200, 100th Cong. (1987). See S. REP. No.
100-83, at 1 (1987).
127. S. REP. No. 100-83, at 13 (1987).
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. . .does not signify a modification of this important patent law con-
cept." '128 No discussion of the proposed tests suggested in the House
and Senate committee reports to determine when a product is materially
changed was contained in the conference report, however, and thus no
guidance to interpretation is available from this source. The House and
Senate committee reports both address the issue of when products are
materially changed; however, proposed tests to determine when a prod-
uct is materially changed from the product of the patented process vary
between the two.
Both reports contain identical wording in the first exception, the
"materially changed" limitation. 2 9 The Senate committee report recog-
nized that "the courts may frequently find themselves in a quandary on
this most important phrase,"' 3 ° and stated that the committee "intends a
specific two-phase test to be implemented." 3 ' The test is as follows:
1. A product will be considered made by the patented process
regardless of any subsequent changes if it would not be possible or
commercially viable to make that product but for the use of the pat-
ented process. In judging commercial viability, the courts shall use a
flexible standard which is appropriate to the competitive
circumstances.
2. A product will be considered to have been made by a pat-'
ented process if the additional processing steps which are not covered
by the patent do not change the physical or chemical properties of the
product in a manner which changes the basic utility of the product by
the patented process. However, a change in the physical or chemical
properties of a product, even though minor, may be "material" if the
change relates to a physical or chemical property which is an impor-
tant feature of the product produced by the patented process. Usu-
ally, a change in the physical form of a product (e.g., the granules to
powder, solid to liquid) or minor chemical conversion (e.g., conver-
sion to a salt, base, acid, hydrate, ester, or addition or removal of a
protection group) would not be a "material" change.13 2
The House report includes identical language concerning the first
part of this two-part test respecting commercial viability of making the
128. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 1087 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
2119, 2120. Apparently, the only concern of the House in receding to the Senate was that, when a
product is made directly from a U.S. patented process but "injunctive relief might not be
appropriate under [the] circumstances, some damage relief would be appropriate, based, for
example, on an apportionment of the contribution of the infringing part to the value of the whole
product in which it is incorporated." See S. REP. No. 100-83, at 51 (1987).
129. See H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 1 (1987); S. REP. No. 100-83, at 13 (1987).
130. S. REP. No. 100-83, at 50 (1987).
131. Id. at 49.
132. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
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imported product using the patented process at issue. 133 In this part of
the test, both houses explicitly agreed the courts should have flexibility
in adjudging when a patented process is either vital or commercially
necessary to make a product. Several factors can make a process com-
mercially viable, such as the steps involved in production (whether they
are energy-intensive or whether a manufacturer has equipment available
that can be adapted for use in the process) and the cost of raw materials
(whether there is an advantage to using a specific raw material). In its
committee report, the House recognized that a "new process may permit
[a] product to be made much more economically." 134
The second part of the Senate's two-part test, the "basic utility"
test, is not contained in the House committee report, however. Applying
the second part of the Senate test is thus questionable, 135 because the
Senate committee report was not issued until after the initial House vote
on the bill,136 and therefore, was not considered in the House delibera-
tions. Additionally, the inclusion of specific examples in the House and
Senate reports may be construed as attempts to dictate specific results in
future litigation, reducing reliability of these examples as interpretive
guides. 137 Interpretation through use of legislative history is accordingly
inconclusive as to determining whether or not a product is "materially
changed" from the product of a patented process.
Using legislative history as his guide, one student commentator
pointed out that "[t]he 'made by' language [in the statute] . . . deter-
mine[s] the extent to which foreign activity leads to infringement liabil-
ity in the United States. The true scope of the statute, however, is not
apparent on its face."' 138 He argued that the conjunctive "or" used in the
statutory caveats has been misused; according to the committee reports,
this "or" should have been an "and," which would call for a product to
satisfy both limitations in order to be considered non-infringing. 39 As
the statute is written, a product need only satisfy one of the provisions to
be considered "materially changed." The author concluded that:
In deciding whether a change is material, the inquiry should
focus on the conventionality of the process for making the change,
rather than on the physical transformation of the product itself. This
133. See H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 13-14 (1987).
134. Id. at 3.
135. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
136. The House considered and passed H.R. 1931 on April 30, 1987, prior to issuance of the
Senate committee report on June 23, 1987.
137. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
138. Glenn Law, Note, Liability Under the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 for the
Use of a Patented Process Outside the United States, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 245, 248 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
139. See id. at 257-59.
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interpretation of section 271(g) gives effect to Congress' desire to
provide effective protection for processes that are patented in the
United States. 140
In other words, when considering whether a product has been mate-
rially changed, the court should look closely at the process by which a
product is changed, rather than comparing the properties of the product
of the patented process to the final imported product.
E. "Practical Reasoning" Approach
As seen in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,1 41 a court may use a vari-
ety of techniques in its analysis and weigh the results against each
other. 142 As also seen in Watt, different judges reach different answers
using the same techniques and materials. Courts should interpret the Act
using each of the two techniques (purposivism and intentionalism) and
compare the results. If both approaches reach the same result, the deci-
sion is likely the proper one. If different results are reached, however,
the court must then determine which values it believes are the most
important to uphold in its decision.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCESS PATENT
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
Two district courts and the Federal Circuit have interpreted the
"materially changed" provision of the Act in two separate cases. This
note analyzes the reasoning and results of each court-and concludes
that two of the courts included "dangerous dicta" in their opinions which
may be relied upon in future cases brought by U.S. process patent hold-
ers against allegedly infringing foreign manufacturers.
A. A Background Case:
Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.
The District Court for the District of New Jersey interpreted the
"materially changed" exception in a suit brought by Marion Merrell
Dow, Inc. ("MMD") and Tanabe Seiyaku Co. Ltd. against Abic, Ltd.
("Abic") and American Cyanamid Co. ("Cyanamid") for infringement
of MMD's U.S. process patent.1 43 Abic, in turn, sought a declaration via
summary judgment of non-infringement for the accused product, dil-
140. Id. at 267.
141. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
142. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
143. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1036, 1036-37
(D.N.J. 1994).
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tiazem hydrochloride. 4 4 Abic is the foreign manufacturer and Cyana-
mid is the reseller of the imported generic product. 145 Abic argued that
since it further processed the direct product of the patented process to
make the final imported product, under section 271(g), the final product
was materially changed from the product of the patented process and
thus non-infringing.
146
The court compared diltiazem precursor (one of the products of the
patented process) and diltiazem hydrochloride (the imported product,
Cardizem) by the amount of their vasodilatory properties. The court
found that Claim 1 of the subject patent covers N-alkylation, which is
the step that activates this cardioselective activity. Ultimately, the acety-
lation and hydrochlorination steps which Abic relied upon as producing
the material change in the product of the process were found to be minor
chemical conversions which affect only the toxicity and adverse side
effects and not the vasodilatory properties.1
47
The court looked to the legislative history of the Act for guidance
in interpreting the statutory exceptions to infringement. 48 It also con-
sidered the stated statutory purpose-to provide "meaningful" protec-
tion to process patentees-and decided that "[m]eaningful protection
will not be provided if an accused infringer can avoid liability under
section 271 (g) when it uses a patented process to produce an intermedi-
ate, converts the intermediate to the only commercially saleable drug
product of the process using conventional techniques, and imports that
final product."' 49
The commonality of vasodilatory properties between the chemical
intermediate product of the patented process and the final imported
product, together with the fact that diltiazem hydrochloride is the "only
commercial saleable drug product of the process using conventional
144. See id. at 1036-37. MMD is the licensee of the subject patent and markets diltiazem
hydrochloride under the trademark "Cardizem." See id. Cardizem is a coronary vasodilator. See
id. at 1037. A coronary vasodilatory dilates the blood vessels of the heart. See Eli Lilly & Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 896 F. Supp. 851, 858 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
145. See Marion Merrell Dow, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1037.
146. See id. at 1038. Claim I of the subject patent covers two situations: where the starter
material is hydroxyl or acetyl. See id. at 1037-38. If the starter material is hydroxyl, the product
resulting from the claim process is diltiazem precursor, and acetylation is further required to
produce diltiazem. See id. at 1037. However, if the starter material is acetyl, diltiazem is
produced directly under the patented process. See id. at 1038. Abic argued that since it starts with
hydroxyl starter material, see id. at 1040, and since acetylation is not included in the claim, it is
not infringing the claim. See id. at 1038. Although diltiazem is converted to diltiazem
hydrochloride by hydrochlorination, the court regarded this step as a minor chemical conversion,
and thus, not a material change. See id. at 1041.
147. See id. at 1040-41.
148. See id. at 1038-39.
149. Id. at 1041.
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techniques," provided a basis for the court to find the accused product
was not materially changed from the product of the patented process,
and thus Abic's motion for summary judgment was denied.1 50 The court
used two different statutory interpretation techniques-purposivism and
intentionalism-and under both approaches reached the same conclu-
sion. Under the practical reasoning approach, since the two approaches
reached the same conclusion, the result was likely proper.
B. District Court Opinion in Eli Lilly and Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co.
One year later, a second district court interpreted the "materially
changed" exception of section 271(g) in Eli Lilly & Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co.' As in Marion Merrell Dow, the case centered around
the importation of a generic drug, the issue being whether the drug was
manufactured in violation of a U.S. process patent and thus infringing
under section 271(g).
Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") brought suit in the Southern Dis-
trict of Indiana against the importers and the foreign manufacturer of the
generic drug cefaclor alleging infringement of its patented process in
producing cefaclor, an antibiotic, and seeking a preliminary injunction
against the drug's importation.1 52 Cefaclor is part of a general class of
antibiotics that all have as a common core the "cephem nucleus."
Although numerous compounds have this common nucleus, few have
been used as antibiotics, and fewer have been sold commercially. Lilly
produces cefaclor by a different process than that covered by the patent
at issue, but in both the process used by Lilly and the process in suit, the
enol cephem intermediate is produced, which is then chlorinated and
subjected to subsequent processing steps to produce cefaclor.'5 3 The
processes start with different raw materials, but both ultimately produce
the same intermediate compound: the enol cephem.154 The Italian man-
ufacturer, Biochimica Opos, S.p.A. (Opos), utilizes a process which
transforms an intermediate compound (compound 5) via a cyclization
reaction into compound 6 (the enol cephem), a step which is covered by
Claim 5 of the Lilly patent.1 55
150. See id.
151. 896 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
152. See id. at 852, 853, 854.
153. See id. at 853. Lilly markets the drug under the name "Ceclor." In the Lilly process, the
intermediate compound exomethylene is converted into'the enol cephem, whereas in the patent at
issue, the enol cephem is produced by a cyclization process. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 852, 853. Claim 5 of the patent in suit describes a cyclization reaction of
various raw materials to produce the enol cephem intermediate, which can then be processed to
make cefaclor as well as other cephem antibiotics. Subsequent processing steps convert the enol
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In deciding Lilly's request for a preliminary injunction, the court
considered two factors critical to issuance: the reasonable likelihood of
Lilly's success on the merits and irreparable harm to Lilly if the injunc-
tion were not granted. 156 Likelihood of success on the merits requires a
showing of validity and infringement, 157 and the court concluded valid-
ity of the patent was established.' 58 In its analysis of Lilly's reasonable
likelihood of success in proving infringement, the court focused on the
subsequent processing steps which converted enol cephem into cefaclor
and defined the issue as whether the imported generic product was
"materially changed by subsequent processes" to remove it from the
Act's definition of an infringing product. 59 The court alternatively
stated the issue as "whether the end product of cefaclor represents a
material change to intermediate compound 6."160
Using guidelines from congressional committee reports, the court
concluded that "the differences between compound 6 and cefaclor are
manifest."' 6 1 Describing the subsequent processing steps used to con-
vert compound 6 into cefaclor as "fairly complex process steps"'162 and
comparing the biological (antibiotic) properties of compound 6 and
cefaclor, the court concluded that compound 6 had been materially
changed within the meaning of section 271(g) and that Lilly was
unlikely to succeed on its infringement action. 163 The court rejected
Lilly's arguments (that the "basic structure of compound 6 is unchanged
by the subsequent processing steps"'' and that the subsequent process-
ing steps are "common, conventional, and routine reactions that are well
known to organic chemists"' 165 ) as unconvincing, and reconciled its
holding as consistent with Marion Merrell Dow. 166 Noting that the
chemical intermediate produced by the patented process at issue in
Marion Merrell Dow could only be converted into one commercially
cephem into cefaclor. See id. at 853. The litigants stipulated that Claim 5 of the patent in suit is
the same as step 5 of the Opos process. Id. at 856.
156. See id. at 854-61.
157. See id. at 854 (citing Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
158. See id. at 855.
159. See id. at 856 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1995 Supp.)).
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (Lilly argued that the subsequent processing steps were "common, conventional and
routine reactions that are well known to organic chemists." See id. at 858. Lilly's expert testified
that these steps result in "rather simple derivatives" because the transformations are "quite
obvious and standard"). See id. at 858 n.8.
163. See id. at 856-59.
164. Id. at 857.
165. Id. at 858.
166. See id.
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saleable drug product and that the two chemicals exhibited similar activ-
ity and efficacy, the court distinguished the case at bar by looking at the
variety of products that could be manufactured from compound 6 and
the significantly different biological properties of cefaclor from com-
pound 6.167 The court noted that Congress chose "to restrict the scope of
section 271(g) to exclude downstream products that, due to intervening
processing, cease to have a strong nexus to the patented process." 168
The court further noted that:
Whereas cefaclor is a medicine, compound 6 is merely a raw material
that can be used for making medicines. Cefaclor, then, is like a fin-
ished automobile, while compound 6 is the iron ore that must be
refined and alloyed with carbon to make the steel to make the compo-
nents of the automobile.
1 69
The court also found that Lilly did not establish the requisite irrepa-
rable harm that would result if the injunction did not issue, suggesting
that "an award of money damages would be an adequate remedy in the
event that Lilly ultimately establishe[d] that the Opos process infringes
the [subject] patent."' 170 The preliminary injunction was denied.
171
The court relied heavily upon legislative history in interpreting the
statute. Considering the purpose of the Act and noting that "in some
circumstances, infringement liability will lie even though the imported
product is subjected to further processing steps that alter its appearance
or structure," 172 the court decided that, by following guidelines set out in
the committee reports, the final product in this case was materially
changed from the product of the patented process and thus noninfring-
ing. Specifically, the court found that the additional processing steps
"change the physical or chemical properties of the product in a manner
which changes the basic utility of the product."'
173
167. See id. at 859. Lilly argued that cefaclor is the only drug that can be conveniently
manufactured from compound 6, although other cephalosporins can be manufactured from it as
well. See id. at 859 n. 11. The court determined that convenience in manufacture was not material
except to the extent of the importance of the change generated by those processes. See id. The
antibiotic properties of cefaclor are mainly attributable to subsequent processing steps, as opposed
to properties inherently present in the intermediate, as in Marion Merrell Dow. See id. at 859.
The court noted that the subsequent processing steps altered the "basic utility" of the final product,
cefaclor, from that of the chemical intermediate. Id. at 857 (quoting S. REP. No. 100-83, at 70
(1987)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 857.
170. Id. at 860.
171. See id. at 861.
172. Id. at 856.
173. Id. at 857 (quoting S. REP. No. 100-83, at 70 (1987)).
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C. Appellate Court Opinion in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co.
Lilly appealed the denial of its request for a preliminary injunction
to the Federal Circuit.174 Judge Bryson wrote the opinion of the court,
which upheld the lower court ruling, 175 and Judge Rader filed a concur-
ring opinion which joined in the denial of the injunction but disagreed
with "the court's reasoning and conclusion about the 'material change'
standard under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)."176
The majority noted that the statutory language of the two excep-
tions to infringement is "not very precise." Recognizing that the case is
a close one for application of that language, the majority acknowledged
the "considerable appeal" of Lilly's argument that the "materially
changed" clause of section 271(g) must be construed in light of its
underlying purpose-to protect the economic value of U.S. process pat-
ents to their owners.177 The court examined the legislative history of the
statute and found that it provided something for each side: "characteri-
zations of the legislation as creating process patent protection that is
'meaningful and not easily evaded,' 1 78 and on the other side, "language
of the statute [that] refers to changes in the product," and "purpose can-
not displace language."
' 179
The majority declined to "stretch the term 'materially changed' as
far as Lilly's argument would require," explaining that the statutory lan-
guage "refers to changes in the product"' 8 ° whereas "Lilly's proposed
test... turns on the quite different question of whether the use or sale of
the imported item impairs the economic value of the process patent."' 8'
The court interpreted Lilly's argument as depending "on whether there
are other products of the first compound that have economic value," and
"look[ed] instead to the substantiality of the change between the product
of the patented process and the product that is being imported" in
174. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
175. See id. at 1569-79.
176. See id. at 1579-81 (Rader, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 1572.
178. Id. at 1573 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 13 (1987)).
179. Id. at 1572.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1572-73. Lilly argued that "the product of a patented process ... should not be
considered 'materially changed' if the principal commercial use of that product lies in its
conversion into the product that is the subject of the infringement charge." Id. at 1572.
Interpreting the purpose of the statute as protection against subversion of protected economic
rights, Lilly argued that the statute should be applied to any scheme that undercuts the commercial
value of a U.S. process patent. It contended that, since cefaclor is the only commercial product of
compound 6 sold in the U.S. market, any change thereto resulting in cefaclor should not be
considered a material change under section 271(g). See id.
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upholding unlikelihood of success by Lilly on its infringement claim. 82
Looking at the chemical and biological properties of compound 6 and
cefaclor,1s3 and conceding that the legislative history does not provide a
"conclusive answer to the question of how the 'materially changed'
clause should be construed in general, and how it should be applied to
the facts of this case in particular," the court upheld the lower court's
decision "that compound 6 is likely to be found to have been 'materially
changed' in the process of its conversion into cefaclor, and that the
importation and sale of cefaclor is therefore not likely to be held to
infringe Lilly's rights under claim 5 of the [subject] patent." 184 Recog-
nizing that the lower court found that "the processing steps necessary to
convert compound 6 to cefaclor 'change the physical or chemical
properties of the product in a manner which changes the basic utility of
the product,"'" 85 the court also noted that "with respect to chemical
products, as to which simple, routine reactions can often produce dra-
matic changes in the products' structure and properties . . . a grudging
construction of the statute could significantly limit the statute's effec-
tiveness."'1 6 The majority agreed with the lower court, however, that a
change in chemical structure and properties as significant as that
between compound 6 and cefaclor "cannot lightly be dismissed as
immaterial."' 87 The majority also held that the district court "did not
commit clear error in finding that Lilly failed to prove irreparable
harm," 188 and did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant the
requested injunction.189
Judge Rader concurred that Lilly did not show it would suffer irrep-
arable harm if the preliminary injunction were not granted, but he
"depart[ed] from the court's reasoning and conclusion about the 'mate-
rial change' standard under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)."19° Recognizing that
none of the parties who fought to influence the statutory language during
enactment were successful in convincing Congress to pass an amend-
ment clearly favorable to either side, and that each side had "lobbyists
... lace the reports with tutorials to the courts about applying the ambig-
uous provisions of section 271(g) in future litigation,"' 91 Judge Rader
found the legislative history concerning the meaning of "material
182. See id. at 1573 (emphasis added).
183. See id. at 1577.
184. Id. at 1578.
185. Id. at 1571 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 857) (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 1572 (emphasis added).
187. See id. at 1573.
188. Id. at 1578.
189. Id. at 1579.
190. Id. (Rader, J., concurring).
191. See id.
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change" in the enactment history unenlightening, and stated that "this
court should interpret this language in light of the overriding purpose of
the statute ... to afford meaningful protection to owners of United
States process patents." 192 The judge noted that "[i]n view of the pur-
pose of the statute, compound 6 and cefaclor are essentially the same
product" 193 as no other current commercial uses of compound 6 were
shown in the record. He also noted that this decision "will create
another massive loophole in the protection of patented processes" and
"deny protection to holders of process patents on intermediates as
opposed to 'final' products."
' 194
V. ANALYSIS OF THE LILLY COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
PROCESS PATENT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
The Lilly courts decided the issue of whether the Act covered a
process patent for an intermediate product that was not itself commer-
cially saleable and that could be produced by other processes in favor of
non-infringement by a foreign manufacturer who imported a product
made by the further processing of the U.S. process patent product. In
doing so, both the district court and the Federal Circuit considered the
purpose and the legislative history of the Act. Unlike the situation in
Marion Merrell Dow, the two approaches did not reach the same result,
and the Lilly courts, therefore, adopted the result reached using the legis-
lative history approach (unlike the Court in Watt).
A. Purposivism
Although both courts in Lilly considered the purposes of the Act as
stated in the committee reports, which are to "provide meaningful pro-
tection to owners of [U.S.] patented processes," 1 95 and "to improve the
rights of patent owners," 196 neither considered the underlying purpose of
the patent system-to "bring forth new knowledge."' 97  From a
purposivist approach, the result reached by the courts in this case contra-
venes both protection of the economic value of a process patent and
disclosure of new knowledge.
The result in this case does not protect the economic value of cer-
tain U.S. process patents (namely those that cover production of sophis-
ticated chemical intermediates that could make final products cheaper to
192. Id. at 1581.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 3 (1987).
196. S. REP. No. 100-83, at 2 (1987).
197. See supra notes 117, 118, and accompanying text.
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manufacture but where the intermediate does not share similar chemical
properties to the imported product), because the courts did not consider
whether the patent in suit made enol cephem production commercially
viable to the foreign manufacturer. U.S. patent law requires that the
utility of an invention be shown prior to issuance of a patent; the patent
at issue here stated its utility as "provid[ing] the higher yielding and
simpler process from less expensive penicillins to give valuable key
intermediates, the 3-hydroxy-3-cephem compounds."'198 The patent thus
covers a process to make a valuable chemical intermediate from less
expensive raw materials than those used in prior known processes.
The district court acknowledged testimony that "the invention...
would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art" and
that "the process ... seemed to go against the grain of what ... a lot of
people . . had been thinking about the way to make the enol
cephem."' 199 This testimony was considered for the validity of the patent
but not for the patent's economic value. The courts never considered
why an inventor would try to find an alternative route to produce an
intermediate which itself has no commercially saleable value. Such rea-
sons could include cheaper raw materials, less energy-intensive process-
ing steps, and fewer processing steps, all factors which relate to the
economic value of the patent as compared to the other known way Lilly
produces the enol cephem.2° The Federal Circuit discounted Lilly's
argument of reduced economic value as depending on whether there are
other known uses for the product of the patented process, and concluded
that under Lilly's theory the intermediate product at issue (the enol
cephem) would become materially different from cefaclor "if and when
[the enol cephem] came to have other commercial uses in the United
States, even though the respective structures and properties of the two
compounds remained unchanged."2 1 However, the court's reasoning
does not reflect a flexible standard to be used in judging commercial
viability, as suggested by the congressional committee reports, because
the court never discussed why the foreign manufacturer uses the patented
process rather than the other known process that is in the public domain.
This question is vital to determine whether it "would not be... commer-
cially viable to make [the imported cefaclor] but for the use of the pat-
"2102ented process.
The result also fails in promoting the disclosure of new knowledge.
Now, owners of such U.S. patented processes must decide whether to
198. U.S. Patent No. 4,160,085 (1979) (emphasis added).
199. Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 855 (internal quotations omitted).
200. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
201. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1573.
202. S. RaP. No. 100-83, at 50 (1987).
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fully disclose the results of their research in a patent, knowing that a
foreign manufacturer may use that knowledge without fear of an
infringement action brought in federal court, or to keep the information
private as a trade secret.
B. Intentionalism
The Lilly courts found support in the legislative history of the Act
in reaching their decisions denying Lilly's request for a preliminary
injunction. The use of legislative history in statutory interpretation is the
most controversial approach of the three foundational approaches dis-
cussed above, and its use in this case demonstrates why it is controver-
sial. In interpreting the "materially changed" provision, the courts used
language from the committee reports that is not included in the statute,
as well as guidelines found in only one committee report.
The Federal Circuit looked to both the House and Senate committee
reports to reach its decision, stating that "under the test set forth in the
Senate report, it is enough to defeat the claim of infringement that there
is another way of producing the intermediate, even if the alleged
infringer does not use that alternative process."20 3 Two problems arise
with this approach. First, the test is not apparent from the text of the
statute, defeating the goal of citizens being "able to read the statute
books and know their rights and duties"2 "; those lacking the time or
resources to research the Act's legislative history would not know of this
test simply from reading the statute.
Second, the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the test does not log-
ically follow from its text. The Senate committee report states that if the
patented process must be used (i.e., it is the only possible or commer-
cially viable way) to make a product, that product will be infringing
regardless of any subsequent changes. In other words, the court will
look no further into the nexus between the imported product and the
patented process. The court interpreted the Senate test to mean that "the
end product will be deemed to be made by the patented process if (and
only if) it would not be commercially feasible to make the end product
other than by using the patented process. 20 5 The Federal Circuit then
looked at the existence of an alternate production route as a break in the
nexus between the intermediate and the final product. The court's inter-
pretation of the test does not follow from its text. The Senate test states
that "[a] product will be considered made by the patented process
regardless of any subsequent changes if it would not be possible or com-
203. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1577.
204. See supra notes 25, 39, and accompanying text.
205. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1575 (emphasis added).
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mercially viable to make that product but for the use of the patented
process.'"206 The court interpreted the test as stating that a product will
not be considered made by the patented process if it would be possible
to make that product by another method. The test states, "A, if B;" the
interpretation is, "not A, if not B;" this is an error in reasoning.
The court's interpretation of the test derives from the Senate com-
mittee report, which states that "[i]f there are commercially viable non-
infringing processes to have arrived at X, the connection between the
patented process for producing chemical X and the ultimate product,
chemical Y, is broken, and Y would be a non-infringing product having
satisfied both phases of the test."2°7 The House committee report does
not contain this example. The Federal Circuit, thus, partly based the
Lilly decision on an interpretation of a committee report test found in the
legislative history of only one house and which does not logically follow
from the text of the test.
George Costello warns that "[t]he Court is wary of efforts in com-
mittee reports to spell out specific results in future litigation if those
results do not necessarily follow from statutory language. 2 °8 Presuma-
bly, if Congress had intended the Senate test to be the law, it would have
included it in the statute. Additionally, the Federal Circuit seized upon
an explanation of the test, which is found only in the Senate committee
report.209 The use of legislative history found only in one report is con-
troversial. Using a test not apparent on the face of the statute (which
looks like an attempt to resolve future litigation), and interpreting that
test using language found in only one committee report demonstrate two
of the problems with such strong reliance on legislative history: it is
very tedious and time-consuming for citizens to research statutes in such
detail, and no one can predict which portions a court will find
influential.
Both courts also point to language set out in the second part of the
Senate test, which analyzes the term "material change" as a change in
the "basic utility of the product [produced] by the patented process."2 '
The problem is that this "basic utility" test is only found in the Senate
committee report, which was issued after the debate and vote on the
House bill (the final consideration by the House before the joint confer-
206. S. REP. No. 100-83, at 50 (1987) (emphasis added). See also supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
207. See id. at 51.
208. See COSTELLO, supra note 68, at CRS-3.
209. See S. REP. No. 100-83, at 51.
210. Id. at 50; see Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 857; 82 F.3d at 1577. See also supra note
132 and accompanying text.
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ence committee report). 211 As discussed above, the use of legislative
history from only one house could violate the presentment and bicamer-
alism requirements of the Constitution.21 2 Additionally, as Professor
Slawson points out, this method of manufacturing legislative history is
easier than amendment. 3  The Lilly courts took legislative history from
the Senate, the second house to consider the bill, and made this "legisla-
tive history" law.
Another problem with the Senate "basic utility" test is in the court's
definition of utility. Comparing two chemicals' utilities by their chemi-
cal properties can be problematic, particularly in the chemical
intermediates field. The Federal Circuit majority noted that "simple,
routine reactions can often produce dramatic changes in [chemical]
products' structure and properties" 214 ; thus, under this court's interpreta-
tion, a chemical product's utility can be easily altered in contradiction of
the Act's purpose to provide protection that is "not easily evaded. '215
Much of the chemical process industry is centered around the production
of chemical intermediates which might be susceptible to this flaw in the
"basic utility" test under the Federal Circuit's interpretation.
The Federal Circuit recognized that Congress "purports to identify
some products that can 'materially be changed' without being 'materi-
ally changed.' ,,2 6 An example cited by the House committee report is a
polymer, which can be easily changed by conventional processes to
make an end product.21 7 Obviously, the intermediate and the end prod-
uct have different properties and utilities, but the House committee did
not think the final product in this example should be considered "materi-
ally changed" from the intermediate. Applying the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of the Senate test to the House example would result in a
finding of non-infringement, further illustrating why specific tests and
examples from the legislative history of only one house should not be
relied upon in statutory interpretation.
Both courts found that the differences in the properties of the enol
cephem and cefaclor constituted a material change in the product of the
patented process, and the Federal Circuit pointed out that the statutory
language "refers to changes in the product. '218 It further stated that
"while the general purpose of the statute informs the construction of the
211. See supra note 136.
212. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
213. See Slawson, supra note 56, at 397.
214. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1572.
215. See id. at 1573 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 13 (1987)).
216. Id. at 1575.
217. See H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 13 (1987). The end product would likely be a plastic.
218. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1572.
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language Congress chose, purpose cannot displace language, and we
cannot stretch the term 'materially changed' as far as Lilly's argument
would require."219
Glenn Law analyzed this statutory provision years prior to the Lilly
case, however, and concluded that the inquiry into whether a change is
material should "focus on the conventionality of the process for making
the change, rather than on the physical transformation of the product
itself,"22 based on the assumption that the statutory exceptions should
be interpreted conjunctively rather than separately. 22' He found that "[a]
direct conflict exists ... between the intention of Congress, as gleaned
from the committee reports, and the literal language of the statute, 222
and that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that in cases where a lit-
eral application of conjunctive or disjunctive language in a statute would
produce results demonstrably at odds with the intent of its drafters, the
intent of the drafters should be given effect. ' 223 He argued that the
examples cited in the House and Senate committee reports "indicate that
a determination of whether a change is material requires a focus not on
the actual physical transformation of the product, but instead on the con-
ventionality of the process required to accomplish the changes. 224
Here, the courts focused instead on the "substantiality of the change
between the product of the patented process and the product that is being
imported, ' 225 which, as discussed above, is a problematic approach in
the field of chemical intermediates. The courts here could have fol-
lowed the precedents cited by Law in which courts have "interpret[ed]
statutes in a manner contrary to their literal language to remedy legisla-
tive carelessness in the use of conjunctive and disjunctive terms,"226 and
found that the "materially changed" provision was not meant to exclude
from the Act's protection a process patent that, due to competitive cir-
cumstances, might make it commercially viable for the foreign manufac-
turer to produce cefaclor.
The legislative history was not used in this case "to confirm [the
Court's] reading of statutory language, 227 or to clear up ambiguous lan-
guage.228 Rather, it was used to reduce vagueness, a use Professor
219. Id.
220. See Law, supra note 138, at 267.
221. See supra notes 138, 139, and accompanying text.
222. Law, supra note 138, at 259.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 262.
225. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1573; see Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 857.
226. Law, supra note 138, at 261.
227. Wald, supra note 36, at 289; see also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 62, 63, and accompanying text.
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Slawson argues is not justified.229 Vagueness "measures the length to
which the legislature chose to go in determining the outcome of future
cases." 23° The Lilly courts adhered to many constraints found in the
legislative history but failed to acknowledge the flexibility granted in
"judging commercial viability," 231 which grant could be interpreted as
allowing courts to interpret the "materially changed" provision without
the severe constraints to which the courts here adhered.
C. "Dangerous Dicta"
Further consideration of the Lilly courts' decisions leads to the
description of the opinions as "dangerous dicta." The issue involved
was whether a preliminary injunction against importation of foreign-
manufactured cefaclor should be granted to Lilly. The district court
cited four factors to be considered in a preliminary injunction request:
(1) reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm
to the movant if the injunction were not granted; (3) the balance of hard-
ships tipping in the movant's favor; and (4) the impact of the injunction
on the public interest.232 The Court noted, however, that it need not
articulate its findings on the final two factors if a "party fails to establish
either of the [first] two ... factors. 233 "[A] movant cannot be granted a
preliminary injunction without findings by the district court that the
movant carried its burden on both factors" 234; the movant must prove
both reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable
harm. Irreparable harms "are those that are impossible to measure in
monetary terms. 235
In Lilly, the district court found that "an award of money damages
would be an adequate remedy in the event that Lilly ultimately estab-
lishes that the Opos process infringes the [subject] patent,"236 and thus
Lilly "failed to establish the requisite irreparable harm. ' 2 37 The Federal
Circuit agreed, finding that "Lilly's ... claims of irreparable injury...
[are not] sufficiently compelling to justify overturning the district
court's conclusion on the issue of irreparable harm. '238 Thus, the courts
concluded that Lilly could not establish irreparable harm and was not
229. See Slawson, supra note 56, at 423.
230. Id.
231. S. REP. No. 100-83, at 50 (1987); H.R. REP. No. 100-60, at 13 (1987).
232. See Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 854.
233. See id. at 861 (emphasis added).
234. Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
235. Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 859 (citing Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chems., 773 F.2d
1230, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
236. Id. at 860.
237. Id. at 861.
238. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1578.
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entitled to a preliminary injunction regardless of their findings concern-
ing Lilly's reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.
"[A] presumption of irreparable harm arises when a patentee makes
a strong showing that its patent is both valid and infringed";239 however,
this presumption is rebuttable.240 The greatest benefit that Lilly could
have received from a favorable judgment by the courts concerning the
reasonable likelihood of its success on the merits was thus a rebuttable
presumption of irreparable harm, a presumption which was successfully
rebutted as both courts decided that Lilly's harm was compensable with
money.241 The dicta concerning the interpretation of "materially
changed" was unnecessary, as it was not essential to the judgment.
However, this "dangerous dicta" can be cited by future foreign manufac-
turers wishing to avoid infringement charges in similar situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Lilly courts engaged in extensive, unnecessary, and "dangerous
dicta" for potential use against holders of U.S. process patents which
produce chemical intermediates that are themselves not commercially
saleable, that can be produced in other ways, and that do not have the
same chemical properties as the final products made therefrom. The
denial of Lilly's request for a preliminary injunction could have been
based on Lilly's failure to show irreparable harm, without the Courts'
intricate analyses of the statute as applied to the facts.
The Federal Circuit recognized that "simple, routine reactions can
often produce dramatic changes in [chemical] products' structure and
properties," and that "a grudging construction of the statute could signif-
icantly limit the statute's effectiveness. '242  The court nevertheless
affirmed the district court's decision despite the lower court's reliance
on comparison of the molecular structure, biological properties, and
pharmacological purposes of the intermediate chemical and the final
imported product.243 The courts relied extensively on legislative history
to reduce vagueness, not ambiguity, and interpreted the statute in a way
that is contrary to its plain language. The Lilly decisions demonstrate
that the average citizen-or lawyer-has no clue as to what may sway a
court relying on legislative history to interpret a statute.
Another troublesome area of dictum in the decisions is the compari-
239. Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 859 (citing High Tech Med. Instrumentation v. New
Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
240. See Reebok Int'l Ltd., 32 F.3d at 1556.
241. Cf. id. at 1558 (noting that since any harm Reebok suffered was fully compensable by
money damages, the presumption of irreparable harm had been successfully rebutted).
242. Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1572.
243. Eli Lilly & Co., 896 F. Supp. at 858.
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son of the sophisticated chemical intermediate, which required extensive
research to manufacture in the patented manner, with a raw material
such as iron ore, which must be refined to make the final product; this
view completely overlooks the technological advancement contributed
by disclosure of the patented process. 2"
Glenn Law has proposed a workable solution to determine when a
final product in the chemical field has been "materially changed" from
an intermediate. As he found in his analysis of the examples given in
the House and Senate committee reports, congressional intent in the use
of the term "materially changed" seemed to focus on the process making
the change, not the difference or similarity in properties of the final
product resulting from the change. Under Lilly, a foreign manufacturer
who subjects a chemical intermediate made by the use of a U.S. patented
process to conventional processing steps may be guilty of infringement
only if the intermediate and the final product share similar chemical and
physical properties and "utility" or if the patented process is the only
commercially viable method to produce the intermediate. The Lilly
courts overlooked the flexibility they were granted to determine when a
process makes the manufacture of a product commercially viable. The
nexus between the intermediate and the final product should be deter-
mined by the nature of the processing steps producing the change, not
the resulting properties of the products. Courts will still have to deter-
mine when a process is conventional or unconventional, but this deter-
mination should be subject to less variation than attempted comparisons
of the properties and utilities of chemicals. "Material change" must be
determined as either in the process or the product, but in the chemical
field, processes should be easier to classify as conventional or not, as
opposed to comparison of chemical properties.
Consider the simple example of an individual who would like to
patent a new process to manufacture methane gas that significantly
reduces its production cost. The gas can be chlorinated to produce chlo-
roform, but the reaction also produces methyl chloride and carbon tetra-
chloride.245 The chemical intermediates in both Marion Merrell Dow
and Lilly were subjected to a chlorination step, which was considered a
conventional processing step. In Marion Merrell Dow, this chlorination
step was a part of a series of conversions that did not change the prod-
uct's "utility," whereas in Lilly, the chlorination was a part of a series of
steps that did. In the hypothetical, the chlorination step certainly
changes the "utility" of methane gas, as chloroform and methane gas
have very different purposes and properties. Under Lilly, a foreign man-
244. See id. at 857. See also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
245. See Louis F. FIESER & MARY FIESER, INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 33 (1957).
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ufacturer would be able to freely use this new methane production tech-
nology which greatly reduces his costs in the manufacture of
chloroform, and then import this cheaper chloroform into the United
States without fear of patent infringement. The inventor would under-
mine his own claim of infringement against the foreign manufacturer by
patenting the process because the foreign manufacturer would be able to
claim as a defense that, since other viable ways to produce methane gas
are available and since other commercially saleable products can be
made from the intermediate, the nexus between methane and chloroform
is broken due to the different "utilities." The economic value to the
inventor of the patented process would be reduced. Less disclosure of
new technology would thus result, contrary to the purposes of the patent
laws to encourage disclosure for the advancement of the technological
arts.
Under the test proposed by Glenn Law, however, the inventor
would have some likelihood of success in an infringement suit because
the chlorination step, being a conventional processing step, would not
break the nexus between the methane gas and the chloroform, despite
the differences in the final properties and "utilities" of the two. This
approach would not subject the protection of the process patent to the
unpredictability of the effects of conventional processing steps on the
chemical properties of different materials.
By allowing foreign manufacturers to evade infringement liability,
the court has done a disservice to the chemical processing industry. A
foreign manufacturer can now infringe a U.S. process patent holder's
invention by several methods with no liability in the United States by
showing that a vital chemical intermediate for a final product can be
produced in any commercially viable process other than the patented
process, by showing that numerous final products may be made from
that intermediate, or even by developing an alternative (possibly undesir-
able) method for making that intermediate. The result would be the
same: the U.S. process patent would be diminished in value, and the
United States would suffer a potential loss of American jobs. Courts
may, by the terms of the Act, find some imported products are too far
removed from the product of a patented process to be infringing. How-
ever, in the case of chemical intermediates where properties are easily
altered by "simple, routine reactions," the courts' approach to the inter-
pretation of "materially changed" leaves some process patent holders in
the same unfortunate position as before passage of the Act, with no
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recourse in U.S. courts against foreign manufacturers who make and
import products using their patented processes.
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